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TIME TO RETHINK SURROGACY:
AN OVERHAUL OF NEW YORK’S
OUTDATED SURROGACY CONTRACT LAWS
IS LONG OVERDUE
CHARLES GILI†
INTRODUCTION: THE EXISTING ILLEGALITY OF SURROGACY
CONTRACTS IN NEW YORK
“Making the decision to have a child – it is momentous. It is
to decide to forever have your heart go walking around outside
your body.”1 This statement was made by author and educator
Elizabeth Stone and expresses the joy that deciding to have a
child can bring.2 Unfortunately, that decision is complicated, and
some people who have decided to bring children into their
families must explore alternate options to effectuate that
decision. Some choose surrogacy to accomplish their wish.
Surrogacy is the process by which a surrogate mother
becomes pregnant and carries the child to term for another
person or persons.3 There are two distinguishable types of
surrogacy. Traditional surrogacy involves becoming pregnant
through artificial insemination using the intended father or a
donor’s sperm.4 Gestational surrogacy involves the surgical
implantation of a fertilized embryo through the in vitro
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2
Elizabeth Stone, Fordham University, https://www.fordham.edu/info/24124/
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WEBMD, https://www.webmom/infertility-and-reproduction/guide/using-surrogatemother#1 (last visited July 2, 2019).
4
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fertilization (“IVF”) process.5 In processes involving IVF, the
surrogate usually has no genetic tie to the implanted embryo.6
Current New York law pertaining to surrogacy contracts does not
distinguish between the two types of surrogacy.7 New York
Domestic Relations Law ("DRL") § 121 defines a “surrogacy
parenting contract” as
any agreement, oral or written, in which: a woman agrees either
to be inseminated with the sperm of a man who is not her
husband or to be impregnated with an embryo that is the
product of an ovum fertilized with the sperm of a man who is
not her husband; and the woman agrees to, or intends to,
surrender or consent to the adoption of the child born as a result
of such insemination or impregnation.8

DRL § 122 declares that all such contracts violate the public
policy of the State and are “void and unenforceable,”9
independent of whether they are for profit.10
While all surrogacy contracts are void in New York, the
State takes an even harsher stance against surrogacy contracts
for monetary consideration.11
DRL § 123 lays out the
punishment for attempting to enter into such a contract.12 The
parties signing the contract on both sides are subject to civil
penalties as high as $500.13 Those attempting to facilitate any
such contract that involves a fee can be subjected to a $10,000
fine for the first offense and may be prosecuted on a felony
charge for any further offenses.14 Furthermore, regardless of
whether a surrogacy contract is for compensation, DRL § 124
indicates that any surrogacy contract signed by the birth mother
will not diminish her parental rights.15

5

Id.
Id.
7
See generally, N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 121–24 (McKinney 2019).
8
Id. § 121.
9
Id. § 122.
10
Id. (stating without particularity that “[s]urrogate parenting contracts are
hereby declared contrary to the public policy of this state, and are void and
unenforceable”).
11
Id. § 123.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id. § 124.
6
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The effect of the current law in New York is multifaceted.
Because the law makes surrogacy contracts that are for profit
expressly illegal,16 and also refuses to honor any surrogacy
contract,17 even where a friend or relative is willing to act as
surrogate, no contract may be devised to ensure that the child,
while in the womb, is legally recognized as the child of the
“intended” parent or parents. Not only does this set the stage for
a difficult legal battle if the surrogate eventually refuses to give
the child to the intended parent or parents, but it also creates a
potentially disastrous situation for the unborn child: if the
intended parents die and neither has been declared a parent to
the unborn child, the child will not be entitled to any death
benefits from those parents.18
Part I of this Note discusses the influential effect of the
much publicized Baby M case19 as well as the societal perceptions
of the time that led to the enactment of New York’s current “antisurrogacy” laws, DRL §§ 121–124. Part II explores changes in
the legal, scientific, and societal atmospheres that have rendered
those laws archaic and unconstitutional. Part III argues that
needed change should come in the form of new legislation meant
to foster, rather than burden, the formation of family.
I.

A.

THE EVOLUTION OF NEW YORK’S “ANTI-SURROGACY”
STATUTES

The Effect of the Baby M Case

The current law in New York exists, in large part, due to the
heavy influence of the infamous Baby M case. To understand the
impact of the Baby M case on New York surrogacy law, it is
useful to look at New York’s stance immediately prior to the case.
New York and other states had taken a neutral stance when
considering the legality and constitutionality of surrogacy

16

Id. § 123.
Id. § 122.
18
See, e.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS § 2-1.3 (McKinney 2019) (stating that
dispositions to “children” will include children who are conceived during but born
after their parents’ life, including nonmarital children). However, if the child born to
the surrogate is not a genetic child of the parent or parents who have died, there is
no legal basis to establish parentage after the fact for purposes of estate distribution.
Id. (containing no relevant language to account for the given set of circumstances).
19
In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
17
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contracts.20 Notably, in In re Baby Girl L.J., the court validated
a surrogacy contract.21 A couple had signed a surrogacy contract
with a woman who agreed to bear a child for them via artificial
insemination using the husband’s sperm, and the couple agreed
to pay the woman $10,000.22 As there were no New York laws
dealing with such contracts at the time, the court examined the
elements of the case individually,23 validating the transfer of the
child to the couple because no alternative action would have
served the child’s best interests,24 and then addressing the
legality of the payment to the surrogate.25 The court cited the
holding and rationale used in a similar case that had been
decided in the Kentucky Supreme Court—a ruling that the
transfer of a child to the intended family and payment made to
the surrogate mother did not violate state adoption laws.26 The
New York court agreed, holding that there were “fundamental
differences” that distinguished the “buying and selling of
children,” which laws against adoption fees aim to prevent, from
the payments made in a surrogacy contract.27 It pointed out that
the reason behind New York and Kentucky adoption laws that
prohibited payments was to ensure that mothers were not being
“coerced” into parting with their children after birth.28
Borrowing the rationale from Surrogate Parenting Associates, the
court explained that the motive of payment in a surrogacy
contract is inherently different:
[t]he essential considerations for the surrogate mother when
she agrees to the surrogate parenting procedure are not
avoiding the consequences of an unwanted pregnancy or fear of
the financial burden of child rearing. On the contrary, the

20
See generally, In re Baby Girl L.J., 132 Misc. 2d 972, 978 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1986)
(ruling that a paid surrogacy contract was valid and did not violate existing adoption
laws); Surrogate Parenting Assocs., Inc. v. Kentucky, 704 S.W.2d 209, 214 (Ky. 1986)
(upholding the formation of surrogacy contracts and voicing the court’s opinion that
disallowing them would be a job for the legislature).
21
132 Misc. 2d at 978.
22
Id. at 973.
23
Id. (parceling the case into two distinct questions: (1) whether the transfer of
the child to the intended family was legal, and (2) whether the payment of a fee to
the surrogate mother violated New York laws).
24
Id. at 974.
25
Id. at 974–78.
26
Id. at 976–78 (discussing the rationale used by the Kentucky Supreme Court
in Surrogate Parenting Assocs., Inc. v. Commonwealth, 704 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1986)).
27
Id. at 977.
28
Id.
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essential consideration is to assist a person or couple who
desperately want a child but are unable to conceive one in the
customary manner to achieve a biologically related offspring.29

The court’s basis for distinguishing paid surrogacy contracts
from adoption laws forbidding payment was that surrogacy
contracts are signed prior to conception and are thus not likely to
represent the perceived evil of a payment intended to entice
giving up an already conceived child.30 Additionally, the court
noted that at the time these laws were written, the legislature
had not anticipated that advancements in science would make
such situations possible.31 Ruling that both the payment to the
surrogate and to the lawyer who created the contract should be
allowed, the court stated that addressing any moral or legal
concerns is a job to be undertaken by the legislature if at all
necessary.32
The case of Baby M involved a paid surrogacy contract in
New Jersey.33 Mary Beth Whitehead was artificially inseminated
with sperm from William Stern after signing a contract with
William and Elizabeth Stern to carry a child for them.34
However, shortly after the child was born, Mrs. Whitehead
decided that she wanted to keep the baby and fled the state with
her husband.35 The case attracted national attention.36 Articles
flooded local and national papers with accounts of the story and
the trial that followed.37 Originally, the New Jersey Superior
Court validated the contract.38
However, the New Jersey
29

Id. (quoting Surrogate Parenting Assocs., Inc., 704 S.W.2d at 211–12).
Id.
31
Id. at 978 (stating that “this court . . . is inclined to follow the majority
opinion [of Surrogate Parenting Assocs., Inc.] by finding that biomedical science has
advanced man into a new era of genetics which was not contemplated by . . . the
New York legislature when it . . . prohibit[ed] payments in connection with an
adoption”).
32
Id.
33
In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1234–35 (N.J. 1988).
34
Id. at 1235–36.
35
Id. at 1237.
36
See generally Robert Hanley, Father of Baby M Granted Custody; Contract
Upheld; Surrogacy is Legal, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 1987, at A1; Iver Peterson, Baby M’s
Future, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1987, at A1; Robert Hanley, Surrogate Mother Battle
Goes to Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1987, at 3; George Andreassi, Surrogate Mother
Mary Beth Whitehead Admitted Today She Made..., UPI NEWS (Feb. 9, 1987),
https://www.upi.com/5733843; Elizabeth Kolbert, In Struggle For Baby M., Fierce
Emotion and Key Legal Issues, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1986, at 25.
37
See sources cited supra note 36.
38
In re Baby M, 525 A.2d 1128, 1159 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987) (holding
that once the surrogacy contract is signed, the surrogate could still refuse until the
30

492

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:487

Supreme Court reversed.39
In an opinion seething with
skepticism towards surrogacy, Chief Justice Wilentz explained
why such contracts violated public policy.40
His language
demonstrated a harsh opposition toward such contracts.41 In the
end, the Sterns were granted custody based upon the best
interests of the child.42 Prior to the case, surrogacy, and
especially surrogacy contracts, had received limited national
exposure.43 Baby M thrust the subject into the spotlight.44
Unfortunately, that spotlight was ill-natured, and based at least
partially upon the selective media portrayal and a ruling filled
with harsh criticism, many states rushed toward policies against
such contracts.45
Cases following Baby M were heavily influenced by the New
Jersey court’s rationale.46 New York was not beyond the reach of
this effect. Soon after the Baby M decision, a case involving a
paid surrogacy contract was heard in Kings County, New York.47
In re Adoption of Paul involved a contract that, in the words of
the court, was “virtually identical” to the contract addressed in
Baby Girl L.J.48 Despite the similarities, despite the prior New
York ruling, and despite the fact that the legislature had passed
no new laws, the court in Paul adopted the stance taken by the
time of conception but not after) aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J.
1988).
39
Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1234–35.
40
Id. at 1240–42. In his opinion, Justice Wilentz describes the intended parents
as the “adoptive couple” who had entered into a “coercion [] contract.” Id. at 1240. He
goes on to discuss that there is potential for “baby-bartering” in surrogacy contracts.
Id. at 1241. Justice Wilentz then undertakes a lengthy explanation of why surrogacy
contracts are against public policy. Id. at 1246–50. He describes how money is the
cause of these contracts and that the underlying “evil” is that the resulting situation
is a mother separated from her child. Id. at 1249–50.
41
Id. at 1249–50.
42
Id. at 1260–61.
43
No major cases or heavily publicized events had yet drawn major media
attention to surrogacy contracts.
44
See generally supra note 36.
45
See, e.g., supra note 36; infra note 53. Many articles were written about the
Baby M case that would have likely inspired strong emotional effects among readers.
Supra note 40.
46
See Jane Doe v. Attorney Gen., 487 N.W.2d 484, 486–87, 488–89 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1992) (relying, in part, on the Baby M court’s equating surrogacy contracts to
“baby-bartering” in holding surrogacy contracts to be “void and unenforceable”); In re
Adoption of Paul, 146 Misc. 2d 379, 384–85 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1990) (holding that
despite prior New York case law, the court would apply the rationale from Baby M
invalidating a surrogacy contract).
47
Adoption of Paul, 146 Misc. 2d at 379–80.
48
Id. at 381.
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court in Baby M, repeatedly comparing paid surrogacy contracts
to paid adoption and declaring the contract void as illegal.49 In
its ruling, the court explicitly stated that it agreed with the New
Jersey Supreme Court’s opinion that such contracts constituted
“baby bartering.”50 New York’s movement towards its current
anti-surrogacy status had begun.
B. Legislation and the New York State Task Force on Life
and Health
Prior to Baby M and cases adopting its rationale, New York
lawmakers had attempted to pass legislation aimed at legalizing
surrogacy contracts.51 In the aftermath of Baby M, in 1992, laws
staunchly opposed to surrogacy were proposed and eventually
enacted in the form of DRL §§ 121–124.52 These laws were a
direct result of the recommendation made by the newly
appointed New York State Task Force on Life and Health.53 This
Task Force was made up of twenty-six members and consisted of
medical doctors, lawyers, professors, priests, rabbis, and others.54
In their official recommendation, the Task Force defined
surrogate parenting as “a social arrangement that uses
49

Id. at 381–85.
Id. at 382. The court expressed that despite the fact that a New York court
had previously dealt with a very similar situation and had chosen not to declare
surrogacy contracts illegal, and despite there being no specific laws in New York
dealing with surrogacy contracts, it agreed with the “infamous” Baby M case. Id. at
381–82. The court adopted the rationale from that case, specifically relying on the
borrowed principle that surrogacy contract agreements constitute “the sale of a
child, or, at the very least, the sale of a mother’s right to her child.” Id. at 384–85
(quoting In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1248 (N.J. 1988)).
51
Mindy Ann Baggish, Surrogate Parenting: What We Can Learn From Our
British Counterparts, 39 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 217, 260–68 (1988) (explaining at
length that proposed New York legislation known as the “Dunne Bill” sought to
legalize and regulate surrogacy contracts).
52
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 121–24 (McKinney 2019).
53
See The New York State Task Force on Life and the Law, Surrogate
Parenting: Analysis and Recommendations for Public Policy, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF
HEALTH (1988) [hereinafter Task Force Analysis], https://www.health.ny.
gov/regulations/task_force/reports_publications/docs/surrogate_parenting.pdf
(last
visited July 4, 2019). New York Governor Mario Cuomo originally commissioned the
Task Force in 1985 with the purpose of “assist[ing] the State in developing public
policy on issues related to medicine, law, and ethics.” About the Task Force on Life
and the Law, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH (Nov. 2016), https://www.health.ny.
gov/regulations/task_force/about.htm. In the spring of 1987, in light of the Baby M
case having given the practice of surrogacy “prominence and immediacy,” Governor
Cuomo specifically asked the Task Force to focus its policy development efforts on
the issue of surrogate parenting contracts. Task Force Analysis, supra, at i.
54
Task Force Analysis, supra note 53, at Task Force Members.
50
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reproductive technology (usually artificial insemination) to
enable one woman to produce a child for a man and, if he is
married, for his wife.”55 The Task Force opined it was in society’s
best interest to take a stance against surrogate parenting.56 The
Task Force based its recommendation on a variety of factors
including the ruling of the Baby M case, private adoption laws,
existing best interest of the child standards, and perceived
societal attitudes toward “deep-rooted social and moral
assumptions about the relationship between parents and their
children.”57
The legislature accepted the Task Force’s
recommendation and passed DRL §§ 121–124.58 These sections
voided any contracts to the extent they dealt with surrogacy
arrangements.59 The courts would thereafter not consider a
signed surrogacy contract against the birth mother for purposes
of establishing parentage of a child.60
Additionally, paid
surrogacy contracts and the brokering of such contracts became
punishable offenses for all parties involved.61 In particular, the
impact of the Baby M case cannot be understated. To this day
New York courts ruling on surrogacy contract cases acknowledge
the impact of Baby M on the current legal landscape.62

55

Id. at iii.
Id. at iv.
57
Id. The Task Force’s report was heavily influenced by the ongoing Baby M
case—so much so that in the introduction of the Task Force’s nearly 150-page report,
the entire first paragraph was dedicated to rehashing the facts of the decision in
Baby M. Id. at 1.
58
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 121–24 (McKinney 2019). In fact, the Task Force’s
“Proposed Surrogate Parenting Act” was adopted and enacted nearly word-for-word
by the New York legislature as DRL §§ 121–124. Compare Task Force Analysis, at
A-1–A-2 with N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 121–24 (McKinney 2019).
59
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 122 (McKinney 2019) (declaring surrogacy contracts
“void and unenforceable”).
60
Id. § 124.
61
Id. § 123.
62
See, e.g., In re Adoption of J., 59 Misc. 3d 937, 938 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2018). The
court in this case ruled that it could not validate a surrogacy contract based upon
DRL 121–124. Id. In doing so, the court specifically noted that “[f]ollowing the
decision in Matter of Baby M., surrogacy was outlawed in New York.” Id. (citation
omitted). The court went on to state that “the law remains the same as it did in 1988
when surrogacy contracts were found to be against public policy.” Id.
56
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C. Medical Technology and Societal Attitudes Toward Family at
the Enactment of DRL §§ 121–124
Surrogacy technology was in an early stage of development
at the time DRL §§ 121–124 passed into law.63 The most common
technique was artificial insemination, as occurred in Baby M.64
IVF was still an emerging technology.65 This provides additional
support to indicate what the legislature considered when
outlawing surrogacy contracts. Surrogacy situations that started
in the same way as in Baby M were considered the norm, and
thanks to that case, did not enjoy public support.66
There is much speculation as to why people began to pursue
surrogacy more frequently. Some sources indicate that infants
available for adoption were becoming more difficult to obtain
around the time of this legislation.67 Others may have considered
surrogacy because of infertility issues or health problems that
could prohibit a safe pregnancy. In fact, the Task Force
specifically considered much of this in its analysis.68 However,
while this legislation was being considered, legislators were
generally only thinking about a very early stage of reproductive
technology and were likely only considering the implications of
these issues as they related to traditional families. Legislators

63

See Jeff Wang & Mark Sauer, In Vitro Fertilization (IVF): A Review of Three
Decades of Clinical Innovation and Technological Advancement, NAT’L CTR. FOR
BIOTECHNOLOGY INFO. (Dec. 2006), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/
PMC1936357/ (explaining the scientific advances involving assisted reproduction
that were occurring in the mid- to late-1980s).
64
Id. (referring to the fact that IVF was still in the early stages of development);
see also W. Ombelet & J. Robays, Artificial Insemination History: Hurdles and
Milestones, NAT’L CTR. FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY INFO. (2015), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.
gov/pmc/articles/PMC4498171/ (discussing how artificial insemination possibly dates
back centuries and was being used effectively at the time IVF began to be used).
65
Wang & Sauer, supra note 63.
66
See generally Task Force Analysis, supra note 53. It seems very likely that
while the Task Force may have realized technology in the medical field was evolving,
it considered the practice that was prevalent at the time, namely artificial
insemination. It is likely that it did not examine the full beneficial scope of what
reproductive technology, including IVF, was becoming capable of.
67
See National Committee for Adoption, Issues in Child Adoption, CQPRESS:
CQRESEARCHER, (Nov. 16, 1984), https://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/document.
php?id=cqresrre1984111600 (“Adoption experts estimate that two million American
couples want to adopt children, preferably healthy infants or toddlers. But only
about 50,000 healthy babies are available for adoption each year.”); Deann
Borshay Liem, First Person Plural: Adoption History, POV (2000), http://www.pbs.
org/pov/firstpersonplural/history/2/ (describing that in the early 1990s, many
American citizens were seeking to adopt children in Central America).
68
Task Force Analysis, supra note 53, at 7.
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did not consider the effects of these issues on same-sex couples
and individuals. To realize this, one needs to understand that
while New York has traditionally been viewed as reasonably
liberal where same-sex rights are concerned, New York did not
sanction an adoption by a same-sex couple until 1997, officially
permit adoption by same-sex couples and individuals until
2010,69 or legalize same-sex marriage until 2011.70 Same-sex
marriages performed in other states were not recognized until
2008.71 Suffice it to say, New York lawmakers were not
prioritizing any attempt to address the effect of dwindling
adoption numbers and anti-surrogacy contract policies on the
same-sex community.72 Nevertheless, the laws that were adopted
based upon the recommendation of the Task Force remain in
effect today and are fully enforced by New York courts.73
II. THE CURRENT LAW IS OUT OF PLACE IN A CHANGING WORLD
A.

What Has Changed Since the Adoption of New York’s Current
Surrogacy Contract Laws?

1.

Surrogacy-Related Technology and Practice

Our world is a different place than it was when antisurrogacy laws were passed in New York. While IVF is still an
advancing technology, it is being used both more often and more
successfully.74 It has been implemented to assist couples and
69
Jay Carmella, New York Governor Signs Law Allowing Unmarried Couples to
Adopt, JURIST (Sept. 21, 2010, 11:18 AM), https://www.jurist.org/news/2010/09/newyork-governor-signs-law-allowing-unmarried-partners-to-adoption/ (discussing how
the bill amended the language of existing New York law so as to make it legal for
same-sex individuals and couples to adopt).
70
See Marriage Equality Act, A. 8354, Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2011)
(legalizing same-sex marriage in New York).
71
See Martinez v. County of Monroe, 50 A.D.3d 189, 192 (4th Dep’t 2008)
(ruling that New York would honor same-sex marriages that were performed in
other jurisdictions).
72
Considering the facts pointed out above, specifically, that New York did not
allow same-sex adoption or marriage until years after the Task Force completed its
analysis and made its recommendation, it follows that the Task Force would not
have considered the impact of a law against surrogacy contracts on same-sex couples
or individuals.
73
See, e.g., In re Adoption of J., 59 Misc. 3d 937, 938–39 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2018)
(ruling that the court could not validate an “illegal surrogacy contract”).
74
See generally Wang and Sauer, supra note 63 (describing the plethora of
advances within surrogacy-related reproductive technologies up to 2006); IVF
Treatment ‘Safer and More Successful Than Ever’, INT’L FED’N OF GYNECOLOGY &
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individuals who have difficulty conceiving for a number of
reasons.75
Many couples that cannot conceive due to the
infertility of one partner may choose to use a surrogate so as to
have a child with the genes of one of the parents.76 Other couples
may choose surrogacy when the woman is fertile but cannot carry
a child due to medical concerns.77
Beyond issues involving fertility, a major development in the
world of IVF has been the advent of pre-implantation genetic
diagnosis (“PGD”).78 This process involves the testing of a
fertilized embryo through the IVF process.79 PGD allows doctors
and scientists to ensure that many genetic and sexually
transmitted diseases are not present in the fertilized embryo.80
Often, the women who utilize this technology suffer from such
diseases and cannot safely carry a child to term.81 Some of these
women and their families seek out surrogates to carry their
genetic children.82
2.

Legal Acceptance Concerning Familial Formation

In addition to changes in medical technology, the legal
landscape has also changed. More than just the legality of
same-sex marriage itself has followed in the wake of Obergefell v.
Hodges. A major focus of the Court in Obergefell was the concept
of family.83 Modern families are now acknowledged, both legally
OBSTETRICS (Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.figo.org/news/ivf-treatment-’safer-andmore-successful-ever’-0015880 (noting that IVF is safer and more effective than
ever); Maggie Fox, A Million Babies Have Been Born in the U.S. With Fertility Help,
NBC NEWS (Apr. 28, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-news/millionbabies-have-been-born-u-s-fertility-help-n752506 (discussing the incredible leaps in
success rates involving pregnancy through IVF technology).
75
Traci Johnson, Using a Surrogate Mother: What You Need to Know, WEBMD
(Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.webmd.com/infertility-and-reproduction/guide/usingsurrogate-mother#2.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Wang & Sauer, supra note 63 (explaining what PGD is and what it is being
used for).
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Kathryn T. Drazba, et. al., A Qualitative Inquiry of the Financial Concerns of
Couple Opting to Use Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis to Prevent the
Transmission of Known Genetic Disorders, NATIONAL SOCIETY OF GENETIC
COUNSELORS, INC. (Aug. 2013), https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1007/
s10897-013-9638-7.
82
Johnson, supra note 75.
83
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599–609 (2015) (discussing the
importance of the concept of family several times throughout the opinion).
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and societally, in a variety of shapes and sizes. Since Obergefell,
federal courts have struck down multiple laws that infringed
upon the familial rights of same-sex individuals and couples,
including a Mississippi law that banned same-sex adoption.84 In
Campaign for Southern Equality v. Mississippi Department of
Human Services, Judge Jordan of the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Mississippi explained the
reasons for granting an injunction that barred enforcement of a
law preventing same-sex couples from adopting children.85 He
explained that the Court in Obergefell had found that laws
against gay marriage violated the Equal Protection Clause and
that the majority in that case “foreclosed litigation over laws
interfering with the right to marry and ‘[the] rights and
responsibilities intertwined with marriage.’ ”86
For similar
reasons, in Pavan v. Smith, the Supreme Court of the United
States held that an Arkansas law that did not allow for both
same-sex partners to be listed on the birth certificate of their
adopted child was unconstitutional.87 These decisions have
effectively legalized same-sex adoption across the country.88
B. Adverse Effects and Issues of Constitutionality
As mentioned in the description of medical advances in IVF
and PGD, anyone with an issue conceiving or carrying a child
stands to benefit from these advances.89 However, the current
law in New York refuses to acknowledge any contract involving
an informed surrogate.90 Even if the surrogate is willing to
proceed without charging a fee, the intended parent or parents
cannot legally protect themselves from a devastating rebuke of

84
Campaign for Southern Equal. v. Miss. Dep’t of Human Svcs., 175 F. Supp. 3d
691, 711 (S.D. Miss. 2016).
85
Id. at 709–10.
86
Id. at 710.
87
137 S. Ct. 2075, 2077–79 (2017) (ruling that the Arkansas statute was not
about genetics and instead gave special recognition to heterosexual couples, and that
this effect was a violation of the principle set forth in Obergefell that same-sex
couples be privy to the “constellation of benefits” that comes with marriage).
88
See, e.g., E.L. v. V.L., 136 S. Ct. 1017, 1019–22 (2016) (applying the full faith
and credit clause to an adoption by a woman who had been in a relationship with
another woman who conceived through assisted reproductive technology and with
whom she had jointly raised such children). The effect of the decisions of federal
courts in cases like Campaign for Southern Equality is that states have been put on
notice that such laws will not hold up under Obergefell when challenged.
89
See supra Part II.A.1.
90
See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 122 (McKinney 2019).
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their agreement by the surrogate.91 Apart from the emotional
trauma this would cause, the intended parents would have
already taken on significant medical expenses for IVF and even
greater expenses if the process involved PGD.92 It would be
difficult to take on such expenses while retaining even the
slightest doubt over whether it would be possible to foresee a
change of heart on the part of the surrogate. Since New York
courts will not recognize a contract made prior to the child’s
birth, any intended parent other than a genetic father, who may
establish parentage prior to the delivery of the child,93 will be
unable to establish legal parentage until after the delivery of the
child through a generic adoption order.94 Beyond the emotional
turmoil that intended parents face when they are not legally
acknowledged as the parents of the child whose birth they
anxiously await, issues such as inheritance and insurance may
come into play.95 Take, for instance, a situation in which the
intended mother passes away before the surrogate gives birth to
the child. If the mother’s will bequeaths her estate in its entirety
to her children, the yet to be legally recognized child could lose
out on any such inheritance.96
1.

The Specific Effects of DRL §§ 121–124 on Women

Since men may establish parentage prior to birth but women
may not—even though the woman may be the genetic parent in
certain situations—it is apparent that the New York law is
91
Id. Since surrogate contracts have been declared unenforceable in New York,
it follows logically that any agreement to volunteer as a surrogate comes with the
possibility that the surrogate renege on her promise to turn a child over.
92
Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis, It’s No Walk in the Park, ALZFORUM
(July 3, 2014), https://www.alzforum.org/news/research-news/preimplantationgenetic-diagnosis-its-no-walk-park (stating that the cost of IVF and PGD together,
even when covered in part by insurance, can cost about $25,000).
93
N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 564(a)–(b) (McKinney 2019) (describing the process by
which a man may, upon an acceptable showing of paternity to the court, be declared
the legal father prior to the child’s birth).
94
See generally N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 122 (McKinney 2019). Since any contract
that recognizes the intended parent, other than a man who can be declared a father
prior to birth, is void in New York, intended parents must wait until the child is
born and then file normal adoption paperwork afterward.
95
See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 2-1.3 (McKinney 2019).
96
Id.; see also N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.3(b) (McKinney 2019)
(providing benefits to a child that was in utero up to twenty-four months after the
death of its genetic parent so long as stated processes were followed). N.Y. EPTL
§ 4-1.3 provides assurances for conceptions after the death of a genetic parent who
documented his or her wishes but does not provide any such assurance for unborn
children in the given scenario. See generally id.
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unfairly prejudicial against women. Although this may not have
been the legislature’s intent,97 the direct fallout is that every
single woman whose child is carried by a surrogate in New York
is barred from establishing legal parentage prior to birth.98
Additionally, if a surrogate refuses to turn over the child and the
mother attempts to obtain the child through legal recourse, New
York courts will refuse to acknowledge a surrogacy contract in
determining which woman is the mother of the child.99
Therefore, the worst-case scenario for a mother is complete loss
of rights to the child, whereas the worst-case scenario for a man
who had parentage established during pregnancy or afterward
via genetic testing would be a court battle over custody.100
Furthermore, single women and women in same-sex
relationships are even more likely to feel the adverse effect of the
current surrogacy laws. When carrying a child is not an option,
they may choose to expand their families using the surrogacy
process. When they do, these women will face the same obstacles
faced by other women, including the inability to be recognized as
a parent prior to the birth and adoption of the child.101 However,
unlike a single man or a couple that includes a man, single
women and same-sex female couples will never be legally
recognized prior to birth under the current law, even if one of
those women is a donor of the embryo.102 Therefore, these women
are faced with riskier factors of inheritance, insurance, and
custody in the absence of a change in New York’s stance against
surrogacy contracts.

97

See generally Task Force Analysis, supra note 53.
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 122 (McKinney 2019).
99
Id. § 124.
100
A man who is the intended father may legally establish his fatherhood prior
to the birth of the child. Once the child is born, the birth mother could refuse to hand
the child over to him. His recourse would be to sue for custody. An intended mother
could not be so recognized, so a traditional custody hearing might not be available to
her. Any legal undertaking that she pursued in order to obtain rights to the child
would undoubtedly be much more complicated. Conceivably, under existing New
York laws, a court could deny the woman all parental rights.
101
See generally N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 121–24 (McKinney 2019).
102
Since, in New York, the only surrogate-utilizing intended parent who may be
recognized prior to birth would be a genetic father, neither partner in same-sex
female couples that use a surrogate, by default, will be able to establish parentage
prior to the birth.
98
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The Specific Effects of DRL §§ 121–124 on Men

Men without a partner and all men in same-sex
relationships, face perhaps the most consistent risk of running
into obstacles placed in their paths to family by the current New
York law. If these men choose to pursue parentage outside of
adoption, the only remaining choice is to do so through surrogacy,
and they will be forced to rely on a surrogate to carry the child
for them. New York’s anti-surrogacy contract laws make doing
this within the safety of a contract illegal.103 Their only options
become to either risk surrogacy absent a contract or formal
agreement, or to pursue a surrogacy agreement outside of the
state, in a more “surrogacy-friendly” jurisdiction.104
3.

New York’s Current Surrogacy Law is Unconstitutional

In Obergefell, the Court declared same-sex marriage legal
across the United States.105 As discussed above, cases that
followed Obergefell solidified the concept that Obergefell is not
limited to marriage, but extends to the benefits that marriage
endows.106 Obergefell and its progeny are not the only cases that
demonstrate a current legal trend towards promoting all versions
of the concept of family. In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the
Court stated in its now famous opinion, that “at the heart of
liberty” is the right of a person “to define one’s own concept of
existence.”107 Even cases that came decades before Obergefell
and Planned Parenthood place great emphasis on the right to
autonomy in personal and familial decisions.108 Following the
pattern of modern legal rationale demonstrated in all of the these

103

See generally N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 121–124 (McKinney 2019).
Intended
Parents:
Surrogacy
Laws
by
State,
SURROGATE.COM
https://surrogate.com/intended-parents/surrogacy-laws-and-legal-information/
surrogacy-laws-by-state/ (last visited June 14, 2019). Based upon its stance against
surrogacy agreements, New York is one of only two states listed as “Non-Surrogacy
Friendly.” Id.
105
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015).
106
See Campaign for Southern Equal. v. Miss. Dep’t of Human Svcs., 175 F.
Supp. 3d 691, 710 (S.D. Miss. 2016) (ruling that a law prohibiting same-sex couples
from adopting was incompatible with the Obergefell ruling); see also Pavan v. Smith,
136 S. Ct. 2075, 2077–79 (2017) (discussing the importance of the “constellation of
benefits” that Obergefell was meant to convey).
107
505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
108
See generally Meyer v. Neb., 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (ruling that there is a
fundamental right to make decisions regarding one’s children); Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (discussing the overarching “penumbral” right to privacy).
104
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cases, it is entirely out of place that any decision regarding the
right to begin a family be outlawed based mainly upon the
preconceived notions of what is morally proper.
Given the current legal trend, DRL §§ 121–124, which as
explained, restrict the smooth transitions of certain methods of
giving birth to and rearing children, is unconstitutional. New
York’s anti-surrogacy contract laws could be interpreted by a
court as in violation of the Equal Protection Clause109 and the
Due Process Clause.110 Based on the adverse effects of New
York’s laws, several groups may have standing to bring such a
challenge against DRL §§ 121–124.
In particular, as laws
outlawing same-sex adoption have been struck down, these New
York laws, which similarly burden individuals and couples
attempting to effect a specific familial decision, are on shaky
ground.111 Two major rationales are considered in the Obergefell
ruling. The first is that the Constitution does not allow laws
forbidding same-sex couples’ right to marry because of the liberty
interests represented by choosing one’s own way of life and
protecting the family structure.112 The second rationale is that
laws forbidding same-sex marriage are particularly damaging
considering that they serve to further harm and subjugate those
same-sex couples.113 The Obergefell Court states that to deny
same-sex couples the right to marry is to withhold a fundamental
109
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State . . . deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
110
Id. (“ . . . nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law . . . .”).
111
Compare Campaign for Southern Equal. v. Miss. Dep’t of Human Svcs., 175
F. Supp. 3d 691, 710 (S.D. Miss. 2016) (striking down Mississippi law that
prohibited adoptions by same-sex couples because such decisions were meant to be
incorporated by the Court in Obergefell) with N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 121–24
(McKinney 2019). As explained, these laws effectively place what can be construed
as an intolerable burden upon couples attempting to pursue a decision to have
children by refusing to legally recognize agreements meant to facilitate such
decisions.
112
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2589 (2015) (reasoning that there is a
liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause that, among other things,
includes the right to make decisions about one’s own “personal identity and beliefs,”
and discussing that marriage choices are among the “the most intimate” of
decisions). The Court also points out that the right to marry is important
as it provides security and a sense of acceptance for the children of those families.
Id. at 2590.
113
Id. at 2590–91 (discussing how the Equal Protection Clause also protects the
right to same-sex marriage because to substantiate such law in light of the “long
history of disapproval of [same-sex] relationships” would work further harm and
serve to “subordinate gays and lesbians”).
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right.114 Regarding situations not foreseen at the time of the
ruling, the Court addressed the possibility of additional need for
change when it stated, “[w]hen new insight reveals discord
between the Constitution’s central protections and a received
legal stricture, a claim to liberty must be addressed.”115
As New York laws against surrogacy contracts obstruct
many people from legally securing their pursuit of genetic
parentage, those who wish to fulfill dreams of family according to
their own perceived ideals will be forced to leave the state of New
York and seek security of contract in one of the forty-eight states
in which surrogacy contracts are enforceable.116
These
pilgrimages—seeking tolerance of one’s own ideas of family—are
eerily reminiscent of pilgrimages made not so long ago by men
and women seeking the right to gain legal acceptance of whom
they chose to marry.117 Such a situation seems to put these laws
in stark contrast to the principles advocated by the Obergefell
Court. The New York law, as it stands, has the potential to have
a disproportionately adverse effect on any person who desires to
pursue parentage through surrogacy and certainly represents a
conflict with “the Constitution’s central protections”118 as they
were understood in Obergefell.
III. PROSPECTIVE CHANGE
A.

Pending New York Legislation: The Child-Parent Security
Act

The Child-Parent Security Act (“CPSA”) is currently pending
approval in New York, and if passed will repeal
DRL §§ 121–124.119 Additionally, the CPSA will set forth legal
114

Id. at 2604–05.
Id. at 2589.
116
Intended Parents, supra note 104. Many states have laws that are favorable
to surrogate contracts. Id. Most others do not have the dramatic “anti-surrogacy”
laws that New York has. Id.
117
See Traveling to Another State or Country to Marry?, LAMBDA LEGAL
(May 27, 2008), https://www.lambdalegal.org/publications/traveling-to-another-stateor-country-to-marry. This article, published in 2008 before the federal legalization of
same-sex marriage, offers advice to same-sex couples who might be considering
leaving their own states to get married. Id. The article specifically addresses some of
the hazards involved in marrying, including the possibility of facing fines or
imprisonment within one’s home state. Id.
118
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2589.
119
A06959A Memo: New York State Assembly Memorandum in Support of
Legislation, N.Y. ST. ASSEMBLY, https://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?default_fld=&bn=
115
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parameters for both paid and unpaid surrogacy contracts120 and
bestow parental rights to the intended parents under the
contract, rather than to the surrogate.121 It will allow all
intended parents to establish parentage prior to the birth of the
child, eliminating many concerns involving insurance and
inheritance.122 In recognition of the concern that such contracts
could be misused against an uninformed party, the CPSA
mandates that all parties involved obtain representation of
counsel in order to ensure that they are properly informed at the
outset of the agreement.123
B. The CPSA or a Similar Law is Necessary in a Changing
World
The reasons to pass the CPSA or a similar law are in no
short supply. They come in the form of addressing the many
issues above. Modern medical technology has progressed to a
point where new and exciting opportunities exist for the many
groups of people who seek to pursue the constitutionally
protected goal of forming a family.124
As these medical
technologies have developed, our country has undergone an
inspiring societal change. Acceptance for the way people choose
to live their lives has become more than just the custom; it has
become the law of the land.125 The acceptance and regulation of
surrogacy contracts by New York would not only be a logical and
positive stride, but a necessary leap in keeping pace with this
trend of acceptance. Under a properly constructed law, people
seeking to become parents via a viable and increasingly common
option will not be forced to leave the state in order to obtain the

A6959&term=2017&Memo=Y (last visited July 5, 2019) [hereinafter A06959A
Memo] (stating in part that the intention of the bill is to repeal DRL §§ 121–24).
120
Id. (“Part two establishes the requirements and procedure for obtaining a
judgment of parentage of a child born through assisted reproduction or pursuant to a
gestational carrier arrangement.”).
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
Id.
124
Wang & Sauer, supra note 63 (describing the advances in relevant medical
technology).
125
See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2589–90 (2015) (citing
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479,
484–86 (1965); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558, 575 (2003)) (ruling same-sex marriage legal based in part upon concepts
supported in multiple rulings within the history of Supreme Court including
“personal choice,” “safeguard[ing] children,” and treating gays and lesbians fairly).
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security a legal contract provides. Additionally, intended parents
will be legally recognized and less burdened during a time
naturally fraught with concern. Many of these intended parents
have already struggled up to the point of surrogacy by dealing
with infertility and other health or acceptance-related issues.
Legalizing surrogacy contracts will at least assure them that
they are legally secure in their pursuit.
The documented legislative intent behind the CPSA states
that “New York law has failed to keep pace with medical
advances in assisted reproduction, causing uncertainty about
who the legal parents of a child are upon birth.”126 It further
states that “[c]onfusion or uncertainty regarding the parental
rights of donors and intended parents (both genetic and
non-genetic) who participate in the conception of the child
through assisted reproduction is detrimental to the child and
secure family relations.”127
These and other statements
documented as the professed intent of the CPSA are evidence
that legislators within New York recognize and see the need to
resolve many of the issues referred to above.128 It also ties
together the legal ramifications in a way that sheds light upon
the deeper resolution proffered by the CPSA: allowing surrogacy
contracts in New York would give legal acceptance to people
whose goal is to begin or expand a family through surrogacy and
entitle them to the same legal recognition granted to other
“traditionally” formed families. The changes proposed by the
CPSA seek to embrace modern legal trends and would resolve
issues of constitutionality currently inflicted by DRL §§ 121–124.
C. Any Negatives of Recognizing Surrogacy Contracts Do Not
Outweigh the Positives
The arguments against allowing surrogacy contracts exist
almost entirely in the moral, religious, and ethical realms. While
these represent legitimate concerns, such problems do not exist
for the entire population. Laws recognizing such agreements will
not force anyone to form such contracts or to pursue surrogacy.
126

A06959A Memo, supra note 119.
Id.
128
Id. In the justification of the proposed bill, it is documented that this law is
intended, in part, to resolve the situation of the current law’s effects upon same-sex
couples. Id. The justification notes that “[b]ecause of existing New York laws,
couples facing infertility and same-sex couples are forced to go out of state in order
to have a child with the assistance of a gestational carrier.” Id.
127
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Some people may still fear situations such as that which occurred
in Baby M. Others may feel that the practice of surrogacy has
the potential to degrade women or that women entering
surrogacy contracts might be exploited. Some may feel that the
practice is offensive based upon their religious worldviews.
However, just as the right to liberty properly allows these people
to choose to practice their beliefs and faiths, liberty should allow
those who need to pursue their concepts of family via surrogacy
and those who are in a position to facilitate such pursuits to
choose whether to exercise those options or not.
It is important to point out that, whatever their reason,
those who seek to disallow such legal recognition in New York
will not, in effect, prevent surrogacy contracts from happening.
Instead, prohibiting surrogacy contracts only forces those within
New York to seek such contracts in other states.129 Even those
who oppose the CPSA or any law like it do not advocate imposing
an impossibility upon those seeking surrogacy contracts, but
instead advocate imposing an obstacle. This obstacle causes
people, already tasked with great adversity, to leave New York
and its wealth of medical facilities, and in many cases their
home, to find unfamiliar doctors and lawyers who can offer them
the security of knowing they can call their child their own from
the beginning.130 The current law is not only unnecessary, but
illogical in that it does not effectuate a proscription, but instead a
grossly inappropriate hurdle that serves the purpose of chasing
people from conducting their legal and medical business within
New York.131
CONCLUSION
In today’s world of advanced scientific technology,
progressive legal trends, and societally broad morals,
anti-surrogacy laws are out of place. Since its inception, our
country has placed an ever-higher emphasis on the right to
personal freedom, and our highest court has placed great

129
Intended Parents, supra note 104. Refusing to honor surrogacy contracts in
New York leaves people who want to pursue such contracts with the alternative of
traveling to a “surrogate friendly” state. Id.
130
Id.; see also A06959A Memo, supra note 119 (noting that existing New York
law requires participants of surrogacy agreements “to use out-of-state clinics and
medical professionals despite the fact that New York is home to world-class medical
facilities and fertility professionals”).
131
A06959A Memo, supra note 119.
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emphasis on the right “to define one’s own concept of
existence.”132 This same country has gone to great lengths over
the past century to protect the rights involving the building of
the family structure, as well as the right to make decisions
within that family structure. In such a country, we should pay
particular attention to laws that burden individuals and couples
who choose an ever-increasingly viable option to build their own
families so that they might enjoy those rights that we have
managed to attain. Instead, it is more appropriate to continue to
pass legislation that fosters familial and societal growth.

132

See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).

